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CURRENT LEGISLATION
Editor-VERNON F.

MURPHY

LIMITATION OF THE BAUMiES FOURTH OFFENDER LAws.-The
proposed amendment ' to Section 1942 of the penal law is intended to
limit its application, by substituting for the fourth felony the following crimes: anarchy, arson, assault in the first or second degree, burglary, crime against nature as defined by Article 66, homicide, except
murder in the first degree, kidnapping, maiming, rape, robbing or
seduction. The present law provides that a person four times convicted of any felony must be sentenced to life imprisonment. The
problem presented to the Legislature is whether the proposed amendment constitutes an improvement on the existing law.
With the theoretical basis of the Baumes Law, it is difficult to
quarrel. For if, indeed, an individual has been hopelessly lost beyond
all possibility of reclaim; if he has acquired, either through mental
disease or through long-continued habit, a propensity to commit antisocial acts, for which there is no cure, then obviously the only safe
thing for society to do is permanently to segregate him. It will do
very little good in such an instance to blame the social organization
for having produced the particular instance of social depravity, or
to engage in lamentations over the fate of the individual. A dangerous and hopelessly incurable maniac should not be allowed to roam
the streets of the state. Similarly, a hopelessly unreclaimable and
habitual criminal should likewise be permanently segregated. There
are those, of course, who say that there are no hopelessly unreclaimable criminals. 2 With that issue we are not here concerned, for the
question is one of fact and of scientific investigation. If there are
such individuals, then there is a scope of permanent segregation. If
there are not, then there is no such sphere of theoretical permissible
state action.
The severe criticism of Section 1942 has been not of its theory,
but of its application and practice. Critics have maintained that the
fear of severe punishment, even of the death penalty, has not in the
past been a crime deterrent, and that the permanent incarceration of
a man merely because he has committed four felonies is a punishment
out of all proportion to the necessities of the case; that some of these
people might in some way be reclaimed for society, or that even if
some of them could not be reclaimed, certainly the state should not
arbitrarily say so in advance and before any effort has been made to
do so or to study their individual situations.3
'Act No. 1033 to amend the Penal Law in relation to punishment for

fourth conviction for certain felonies, introduced by Mr. Sargent Feb. 12, 1930.

'Except, of course. mental and physical defectives. See Barnes, The Repression of Crime (1926), p. 26.
'Ibid. at pp. 342, 343.
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A more immediately important criticism has been that the word
"felony" contained in Section 1942, includes such a variety of crimes,
that a person may be sent to prison for life for committing a series
of offenses which do not render him a serious social menace, and
that in that way severe punishment is meted out to people whose
crimes do not seem, to a liberal-minded public, to merit such severe
vengeance on the part of the state. Editorial and newspaper comment in connection with the recent sentence of life imprisonment
meted out to Ruth St. Clair, is only one instance of the public interest
that is aroused when such an obvious miscarriage of purpose results
from the application of the Baumes Law. ,The amendment here discussed is undoubtedly intended to meet that situation, and proceeding
on the theory that the principle of the Baumes Law is sound when
applied to fourth offenders who have committed serious crimes
involving moral turpitude or danger to society, it specifies such crimes
in order to insure that the mere repeated conviction for the unenumerated felonies will not result in life imprisonment.
It is submitted that the amendment is haphazard and unscientific,
and that in selecting the particular crimes for which four convictions
will result in life imprisonment, no study has been made of the relation between each particular selected crime, and the type of people
who commit it.
Lumped together in one list are political crimes, crimes of
violence and sexual crimes. It is reasonable to assume, even without having any evidence, that there is a vast difference between
the typical habitual criminal who is engaged in burglary, and one who
is engaged in crime against nature, or in rape or seduction. Again
the crime of anarchy is not one which follows in the wake of crime
waves. And to incarcerate anarchists for the period of their lives
savors of Siberia, and methods popular in Russia and not in more
Occidental civilizations.
Undoubtedly, the emergency calls for the passage of this amendment, for it will at least eliminate from the operation of the statute
all offenses which are less serious than those listed in the amendment.
But, nevertheless, we cannot avoid the conclusion that the amendment
is indicative of a certain discouraging method of criminal law-making.
One need not be equipped with criminological statistics to realize
that the regulation of criminal law involves a detailed study of the
psychology, and the social and economic life of men convicted of
crime. Few will admit, although some still assert that vengeance is
even now the basis of our criminal law. To some extent this is
inevitable. As Mr. Justice Holmes has long ago pointed out in his
great work on the Common Law: 4 "There remains to be mentioned
the affirmative argument in' favor of the theory of retribution, to the
effect that the fitness of punishment following wrongdoing is axiomatic and is instinctively recognized by unperverted minds. I think,
it will be seen on self-inspection, that this feeling of fitness is absolute
'Holmes, The Common I:aw (1881), p. 45.
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and unconditional only in the case of our neighbors. It does not
seem to me that any one who has satisfied himself that an act of his
was wrong, and that he will never do it again, would feel the least
need or propriety, as between himself and an earthly punishing power
alone, of his being made to suffer for what he had done, although,
when third persons were introduced, he might, as a philosopher,
admit the necessity of hurting him to frighten others. But when our
neighbors do wrong, we sometimes feel the fitness of making them
smart for it, whether they have repented or not. The feeling of fitness seems to me to be only vengeance in disguise, and I have already
admitted that vengeance was an element, though not the chief element
of punishment." Nevertheless, it may be assumed as a postulate of
sound legal philosophy that the excellence of the criminal law is
directly proportional to the extent to which it abandons vengeance as
a criterion and adopts prevention and reform as the essential basis
for dealing with crimes and criminals.
It is difficult to say how this can be accomplished without the
complete individualization of the treatment of criminals. For if the
truth were known, it should probably be found that every member of
every gang, no matter how closely affiliated with his colleagues, was
nevertheless an individual distinct and apart from the other members
of the gang, and for whose emancipation from the life of crime, an
individual study aiid treatment was necessary. The theory of modem education wghich is based on factual studies leaves that impression
with regard to the non-criminal portions of our society. In the
absence of data it is, of course, not safe to assume anything. But
the chief lesson, here as elsewhere, is that uninformed legislation
cannot be expected to be significantly corrective. 5
VERNON F.

MURPHY.

FILING OF CONTRACTS OF CONDITIONAL SALES IN NEW YORK.-

Legislation which has for its goal the clarification of enactments
which have to do with the filing of conditional sales contracts cannot
fail to be of value. A study of existing laws reveals solely confusion
and contradiction. The new bill promises relief to a branch of the
law in which succor is sadly needed.
The bill in substance provides that the filing of conditional sales
contracts, provided for in Sections 65, 66, and 67 "of this Article"
shall be valid for a period of three (3) years only, "except that, in
the counties embraced in the city of New York, such filing shall be
valid for one (1) year only." We must look to the history of
conditional sales contracts to appreciate and comprehend the necessity
for such an amendment.
Under the common law in New York, as in many other states,
it was settled that a conditional vendor of goods retained title as
'Cf. Lawes, Crime and Rehabilitation, New York State Bar Assn. Bull.,

Jan., 1930.

